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 ince the 1955 commissioning of the USS Nautilus, the first nuclear-
powered warship, many such warships, mainly submarines, have been used 
in armed conflicts. The first strike by a nuclear-powered warship occurred 
during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War of 1982, when the British attack 
submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano 
in the South Atlantic Ocean.1 No nuclear-powered warships have been sunk 
or damaged by an opposing belligerent in armed conflicts, however, more 
than a few accidents have occurred during combat missions, such as muni-
tions explosions on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise, the first nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier, during operations off the coast of Vietnam in 
1969.2 
There have been non-combat losses of nuclear-powered warships dur-
ing sea trials and peacetime patrol missions: the U.S. Navy lost two nuclear 
submarines, the USS Thresher and USS Scorpion, in 1963 and 1968, respec-
tively, in the Atlantic Ocean.3 Several nuclear submarines of the Soviet Un-
ion/Russian Federation have been lost in the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific 
Oceans, including the K-8 in Biscay Bay in 1970 and the K-278 (Komosomolets) 
in the Norwegian Sea in 1989.4 The best-known recent tragedy was the sink-
ing of the K-141(Kursk) in the Barents Sea in 2000.5 In addition to these ac-
                                                                                                                      
1. 2 LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE FALKLANDS CAM-
PAIGN: WAR AND DIPLOMACY 296–98 (2007). 
2. NORMAN POLMAR ET AL., CHRONOLOGY OF THE COLD WAR AT SEA 1945–1991, 
at 131 (1998). Nuclear weapon accidents (referred to as Broken Arrow cases), such as the 
1966 Palomares incident in Spain, are not analyzed in this article. Broken Arrow cases 
involving warships of a belligerent State include one in which an A-4 attack aircraft armed 
with a nuclear bomb onboard the USS Ticonderoga fell off an elevator into deep water 
eighty miles from a Japanese island while the ship was returning from a combat mission in 
Vietnamese waters to the Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan in 1965. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE, NARRATIVE SUMMARIES OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
1950–1980 (1981), https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/635.pdf; David Sang-
er, U.S. Confirms It Lost an H-Bomb off Japan in ‘65, NEW YORK TIMES (May 9, 1989), 
www.nytimes.com/1989/05/09/world/us-confirms-it-lost-an-h-bomb-off-japan-in-
65.html. 
3. POLMAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 78, 127. The loss of the USS Thresher was the 
world’s first loss of a nuclear-powered vessel. 
4. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA-TECDOC-1242, INVENTORY OF 
ACCIDENTS AND LOSSES AT SEA INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 24–25 (2001). 












cidents, the Russian Navy has abandoned decommissioned nuclear subma-
rines and their reactors in and around its territorial sea. It has been reported 
that nuclear contamination is spreading from some of these sinking sites.6 
It is also conceivable that combat losses of nuclear-powered warships 
could cause contamination of civilians, civilian objects and the natural envi-
ronment. If such combat losses occur at sea, both belligerent and neutral 
States will have to deal with a difficult question: to what extent and by who 
can harm resulting from such contamination be compensated for by pay-
ment of damages. 
This article examines legal issues stemming from prospective combat 
losses of nuclear-powered warships from the perspective of the laws of 
armed conflict and neutrality at sea. More specifically, it attempts to dissect 
whether nuclear contamination incidentally caused to civilians, civilian ob-
jects and the natural environment during international armed conflict can be 
properly categorized as collateral damage as envisaged by the laws of armed 
conflict and neutrality at sea, the lawfulness of which is assessed according 
to the principle of proportionality.7 
                                                                                                                      
6. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-4, NUCLEAR SAFETY: 
CONCERNS WITH NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND OTHER SOURCES OF RADIATION IN THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION 10–12 (1995); Alexey V. Yablokov, Radioactive Waste Disposal in 
Seas Adjacent to the Territory of the Russian Federation, 43 MARINE POLLUTION BULLETIN 8 
(2001). Neither France nor the UK has suffered the loss of a nuclear-powered warship, 
although submarines of both countries have been involved in collisions with other subma-
rines. John F. Burns, French and British Submarines Collide, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/world/europe/17submarine.html. No de-
tailed reliable information has been revealed regarding serious incidents or losses during 
sea trials or operations of Chinese nuclear submarines, such as the 1985 incident involving 
a Type 092 boat (Xia Class SSBN). 
7. This article focuses exclusively on losses that occur during international armed con-
flicts, not those that may occur during non-international armed conflicts. It has been 
thought that the law of neutrality is only applicable to inter-State armed conflicts, especial-
ly de jure wars. In cases of non-international armed conflicts such as civil wars, the law of 
neutrality is inapplicable unless the legitimate government or foreign countries explicitly or 
implicitly recognize an insurgent as a belligerent. However, classification of armed conflict 
is not always easy. If a cross-Taiwan Strait armed conflict breaks out, both the Chinese 
and U.S. navies will deploy their nuclear-powered warships. The armed conflict between 
these two States will no doubt be an international one. However, until the Taiwanese gov-
ernment explicitly abandons its One-China Policy, it seems theoretically difficult for Tai-
wan to say that its conflict with China is international. One idea for internationalizing this 
conflict is to invoke Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, infra 
note 13, to which China is a party, by arguing that the people of Taiwan have the right of 













Undoubtedly, it is also necessary to analyze nuclear contamination 
caused by belligerent actions from the perspective of international environ-
mental law. However, before stepping into the arena of international envi-
ronmental law and considering such legal interrelationships in times of 
armed conflict,8 it is first appropriate to consider to what extent the law of 
armed conflict and the law of neutrality at sea can provide explicit rules, 
namely, effective criteria to assess the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear 
contamination during armed conflict.9 
 
II. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DETERMINING 
ITS SCOPE10 
 
A. Collateral Damage Based on the Principle of Proportionality 
 
The most basic principle of the law of armed conflict is that of target dis-
tinction. Under this principle, attacks, whether occurring in offensive or in 
defensive operations, must be directed only against lawful targets, namely 
combatants and military objectives of an opposing belligerent State. Enemy 
civilians and civilian objects are immune from attack. However, the law of 
armed conflict does not prohibit attacks that may cause collateral damage to 
civilians and civilian objects, although attacks which may be expected to 
cause excessive collateral damage in relation to the military advantage antici-
pated are deemed unlawful. 
                                                                                                                      
actual colonial domination or foreign occupation. Taiwan has not been under Chinese 
control in this regard since 1949. 
8 . See generally PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
(Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King & Ronald S. McClain eds., 1996) (Vol. 69, U.S. Naval 
War College International Law Studies); SONJA ANN JOZEF BOELAERT-SUOMINEN, IN-
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND NAVAL WAR: THE EFFECT OF MARINE 
SAFETY AND POLLUTION CONVENTIONS DURING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
(2000) (U.S. Naval War College Newport Paper No. 15). For the latest report submitted to 
the International Law Commission (67th Session) on this issue, see Marie G. Jacobsson, 
(Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Con-
flicts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/685 (May 28, 2015). 
9. This article does not discuss other legal issues such as sovereign immunity, civil lia-
bility and underwater cultural property. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Natalino 
Ronzitti (Rapporteur), The Legal Regime of Wrecks of Warships and Other State-Owned Ships in 
International Law, 74 YEARBOOK OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (2012). 
10. Collateral damage, as used in this article, encompasses the incidental loss of civil-












This collateral damage rule is based on the proportionality principle, 
which “makes large concessions in favor of military necessity.”11 Still, it is 
difficult to give a clear answer to the question of how to calculate the bal-
ance between the anticipated military advantage and collateral damage.12 The 
1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (API) codi-
fied this rule in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii).13 Although as treaty provi-
sions, these Articles are only applicable to attacks affecting civilians and ci-
vilian objects on land due to the geographical limit imposed by Article 49(3), 
the proportionality principle contained therein is regarded as a fundamental 
part of the customary law of armed conflict.14 
It should be noted that the collateral damage rule is the only law of 
armed conflict provision that allows damage to civilians not taking direct 
part in hostilities and civilian objects,15 except for those regulating belliger-
ent reprisals. If damage to civilians and civilian objects is considered collat-
eral damage as envisaged by API or the customary law of armed conflict, 
                                                                                                                      
11. 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CONFERENCE OF GOV-
ERNMENT EXPERTS ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS: PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN 
POPULATION AGAINST DANGERS OF HOSTILITIES 85 (1971). 
12. MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES 
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS AD-
DITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 361 (1982). 
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
14. The International Committee of the Red Cross study on customary international 
humanitarian law deems the proportionality principle valid irrespective of the theater of 
operations. See Rule 14 in 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46–50 
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. It should 
be noted, however, that some countries declared at the time of signature or ratification 
that the rules established by API are not intended to have any effect on and do not regu-
late the use of nuclear weapons. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 502, 506, 510, 512 
(Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000). If these declarations or reservations 
are valid, the API rules would not be applicable to damage inflicted by radiation resulting 
from the use of nuclear weapons. They would, however, be applicable to nuclear contami-
nation as discussed in this article. 
15. Civilians and other protected persons may be directly attacked only if they are tak-
ing a direct part in hostilities. Although they retain their civilian or protected status, it is 
considered that they themselves forfeit their immunity from attack during their direct par-
ticipation in hostilities. On the other hand, objects such as houses, schools or places of 
worship that are usually used for civilian purposes may be attacked if they are used for 
military purposes. Unlike civilians taking direct part in hostilities, these objects no longer 













and if not excessive to the anticipated military advantage, neither an injured 
belligerent State nor its civilian victims can claim compensation. However, if 
the damage is excessive, victim States are not prohibited from making 
claims for such damage. Therefore, it is crucial to determine whether specif-
ic harm to civilians, civilian objects or the natural environment is character-
ized as collateral damage. 
 
B. Legal Issues Stemming from the Combat Loss of Nuclear-Powered Warships 
 
There are interesting legal issues relating to incidental damage caused by nu-
clear contamination from the combat loss of a nuclear-powered warship of 
a belligerent State. First, while the customary rules related to collateral dam-
age at sea are basically the same as those related to land warfare, given the 
difference in the legal character of the operational theaters between land and 
naval warfare, it is necessary to consider the difference of the various mari-
time areas in which collateral damage may occur. In this regard, the legal 
status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)16 during armed conflict, espe-
cially the EEZ of a neutral coastal State, is particularly relevant. 
It could be said that any belligerent operation causing incidental damage 
to persons and objects on neutral territory, including territorial seas (for in-
stance, damage incidentally caused by attacks on petroleum, oil and lubrica-
tion depots in neighboring belligerent land territory), is treated as unlawful 
whether or not such damage is excessive simply because of the inviolability 
of the territory of neutral States. On the other hand, because hostilities on 
the high seas are not unlawful per se, incidental damage to a neutral State 
national’s drift fishing net by the explosion of a belligerent’s anti-submarine 
torpedoes might be argued to be collateral damage, with its lawfulness 
judged by the proportionality principle. 
The lawfulness of causing collateral damage in a neutral EEZ would 
perhaps depend on the question of whether or not the EEZ’s nature is 
more similar to that of territorial seas than to that of the high seas from the 
perspective of the laws of armed conflict and neutrality at sea. 
                                                                                                                      
16. The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to a State’s territorial 
sea and extends to a maximum width of 200-nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breath of the territorial sea is measured. Within this zone, the coastal State has sover-
eignty over the natural resources and jurisdiction over certain specified activities. United 













Second, the legal character of nuclear contamination caused by belliger-
ent actions must be discussed. There is no doubt that physical damage such 
as acute radiation syndrome suffered by enemy civilians as a result of the 
explosion of a nuclear bomb directed against enemy military objectives 
should be treated as collateral damage, the lawfulness of which is assessed in 
accordance with the proportionality principle. 17  However, it is not clear 
whether or to what extent non-physical damage, such as low-level nuclear 
contamination, can be regarded as collateral damage within the scope of the 
laws of armed conflict and neutrality. 
Third, it appears that the rule on collateral damage presupposes inci-
dental damage caused by the attacker’s means of warfare such as shells, 
bombs, missiles or torpedoes. Is similar treatment appropriate for damage 
caused by dangerous forces contained in destroyed military objectives, such 
as nuclear pollution emanating from a nuclear-powered warship damaged by 
conventional weapons? In fact, API restricts destruction of certain kinds of 
works and installations containing dangerous forces on the ground, such as 
nuclear electrical generating stations, even if they fall within the scope of 
military objectives. Of course, this particular provision of API is not appli-
cable as a treaty rule to naval warfare. The issue, as discussed in this article, 
is whether such damage is to be considered as collateral damage under the 
law of armed conflict. 
 
III. COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE AND THEATERS OF NAVAL WARFARE 
 
A. Neutral Land Territory and Territorial Seas 
 
The most basic principle of the law of armed conflict, the principle of dis-
tinction, is applicable to armed conflict at sea. The same can be said of the 
collateral damage rule based on the principle of proportionality, a corollary 
of this basic principle. The 1994 San Remo Manual confirms this, although it 
                                                                                                                      
17. Radiation syndrome suffered by combatants of a belligerent State cannot be dis-
cussed within the scope of collateral damage. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of such suf-
fering is assessed in accordance with another basic principle applicable only to combatants 
(and others who may be lawfully attacked, for example, those who directly participate in 
hostilities): the prohibition of means and methods of warfare causing superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. However, as noted above, some countries made declarations or 
reservations on signing or ratifying API on the applicability of the newly established treaty 













uses slightly different wording from the relevant API articles.18 However, 
there are considerable differences between land and naval warfare19 as to 
where belligerent States may lawfully engage in hostilities against the oppos-
ing belligerent. In general, the theater of operations in land warfare is limited 
to belligerent territory, including internal waters. Incidental damage to civil-
ians and civilian objects of a belligerent territorial State, as well as those of 
neutrals present in the belligerent State’s territory, can be legally evaluated 
according to the collateral damage rule. Thus, if the damage is not excessive, 
attacks causing such damage will be considered as lawful.  
By contrast, attacks against military objectives located in belligerent ter-
ritory leading to incidental damage in neighboring neutral States, whether 
excessive or not, are unlawful. A typical example, as noted previously, is the 
damage caused to civilian populations in neutral territory as a result of the 
bombing of petroleum facilities located in a neighboring belligerent State. 
This is because the law of neutrality dictates that any act of warfare is 
banned in neutral territory and the neutral duty of acquiescence does not 
extend to cover such spillover damage to neutral territory.20 In fact, the neu-
                                                                                                                      
18. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA ¶ 46(d) (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL] 
(“With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: . . . (d) an attack shall 
not be launched if it may be expected to cause collateral casualties or damage which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the 
attack as a whole; an attack shall be cancelled or suspended as soon as it becomes apparent 
that the collateral casualties or damage would be excessive.”). See also UNITED KINGDOM 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 13.32(d) 
(2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. 
19. In this article, the law of armed conflict at sea or naval warfare means the law 
concerning the conduct of hostilities and other operations against targets at sea and pro-
tection of certain personnel and objects at sea. Missile attacks against ships at sea by land 
or land-based air forces are thus covered by this law. 
20. Since the current international law denounces the de jure state of war, the validity 
of the law of neutrality is quite uncertain. Although it is the third State’s discretion to 
choose to be a strict neutral observing the traditional law of neutrality, the rights and du-
ties of a State not involved in an inter-State armed conflict that has not taken a strict neu-
tral position has never been clearly described. In this article, all States other than belliger-
ents are considered as neutrals. The legal analysis of incidental damage caused to the third 
State not taking a strict neutral position is much more complicated. A good example is 
nuclear contamination that would result to the coastlines of Japan’s southwest islands by 
combat losses of nuclear-powered warships in the East China Sea during a hypothetical 
Sino-American war, where Japan would have to provide bases to U.S. forces under the 
1960 U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. Such a war would be the first in which both bel-












tral duty of acquiescence mainly relates to the capture or seizure of neutral 
goods and vessels to prevent the carriage of war materials and armaments to 
a belligerent. A neutral State has not been required to acquiesce to damage 
to its territory caused by actions of a belligerent State.21 
 
B. Civilians and Civilian Objects in Belligerent Land Territory and Territorial Seas 
 
As described earlier, incidental damage caused by engagements at sea to ci-
vilians and civilian objects located in belligerent land territory are properly 
considered collateral damage as defined by the law of armed conflict. There-
fore, its lawfulness is assessed according to the proportionality principle.  
While the proportionality principle constitutes a customary international 
law rule, it is appropriate to reconfirm that engagement at sea causing inci-
dental damage to civilians and civilian objects on belligerent land territory is 
the only case of naval warfare to which collateral damage treaty rules apply. 
API Article 49(3) provides that API’s rules on the general protections 
against the effects of hostilities, namely Articles 48 to 67, 
 
apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the civilian popula-
tion, individual civilians or civilians on land. They further apply to all at-
tacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not 
otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict 
at sea or in the air.22 
 
Although Article 49(3) is silent on sea warfare affecting civilians and civilian 
objects located in belligerent internal waters, it is safe to say that the term 
“land” includes internal waters. The same might not be said, however, of 
civilians and civilian objects in a belligerent’s territorial sea,23 consequently 
only customary collateral damage rules are applicable to damages they incur. 
                                                                                                                      
the loss of a nuclear-powered warship of a belligerent State in the East China Sea, see 
James Kraska, How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015, 54 ORBIS 35 (Winter 2010). 
21. There is a view that a belligerent State is not responsible for incidental damage to 
a neutral. See, e.g., Richard L. Weiner, Limited Armed Conflict Causing Physical Damage to Neu-
tral Countries: Questions of Liability, 15 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUR-
NAL 161, 168 (1985). However, as far as damage to neutral territory is concerned, there 
appears to be no reason to conclude that a neutral is obliged to acquiesce to such damage. 
22. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 49(3). 
23. The application of Article 49(3) to internal waters, but not to the territorial sea, 
turns on the meaning of “land.” Although theoretically its meaning might be different 
from that used in the law of the sea, it is natural to suppose that it has the same meaning 













In any event, many authors interpret Article 49(3)’s badly drafted and 
complicated provisions as imposing no restrictions on traditional means of 
economic warfare at sea, including capture of merchant vessels and belliger-
ent blockades that might affect civilian populations on land, despite its first 
sentence. According to this view, Article 49(3) only applies to rather limited 
situations, such as naval gunfire against ground targets or destruction of tar-
gets at sea causing physical damage to facilities on land,24 thus making API’s 
collateral damage rules, namely Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii), applicable 
to these categories of collateral damage occurring in the belligerent’s land 
territory. 
 
C. Belligerent and Neutral Merchant Shipping on the High Seas 
 
The interrelationship between the law of the sea, including the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),25 and the laws of armed conflict and 
neutrality at sea has long been subject to discussion.26 The general applica-
bility of the LOSC and customary rules of the law of the sea in times of 
armed conflict is theoretically approved because of the abolition of the de 
jure state of war by the UN Charter.27 However, it has been widely accepted 
that engaging in hostilities against enemy forces and conducting other bel-
ligerent actions against certain enemy and neutral merchant shipping on the 
high seas are not in themselves unlawful.28 
                                                                                                                      
The State exercises a more limited sovereignty over the territorial sea, with ships of other 
States having certain navigation rights therein. These rights of entry into the territorial sea 
do not require coastal State consent, as would be the case for entry into internal waters. 
24. See, e.g., Henri Meyrowitz, Le Protocole Additionnel I aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 
et le Droit de la Guerre Maritime, 89 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
243 (1985). Contra ELMAR RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: REPERCUSSIONS 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 57–66 (1984). 
25. LOSC, supra note 16. 
26. See, e.g., Richard J. Grunawalt, Belligerent and Neutral Rights in Straits and Archipelagoes, 
in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 137 (Thomas A. Clingan ed., 1986); 
Vaughan Lowe, The Impact of the Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 657, 682 (1988). 
27. See generally Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the “State of War,” 62 AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 58 (1968). 
28. Even after the prohibition of war and the use of force by the UN Charter, there 
are only a few precedents in which States explicitly opposed a belligerent’s operations on 












Judging from the general recognition of the lawfulness of belligerent 
operations on the high seas, incidental damage to enemy merchant shipping 
is treated as collateral damage under the laws of armed conflict and neutrali-
ty. Curiously, the traditional law of neutrality at sea has barely addressed col-
lateral damage to neutral shipping. Nonetheless, as neutral ships are located 
on the high seas where hostilities by belligerents are allowed, it could be said 
that such damage on the high seas is categorized as collateral damage, the 
lawfulness of which is assessed following the proportionality principle. For 
instance, non-excessive splinter damage to belligerent and neutral merchant 
vessels caused by the explosion of belligerent anti-ship missiles launched 
against the opposing belligerent’s surface combatants on the high seas could 
be considered collateral damage.29 
 
D. Neutral Exclusive Economic Zones 
 
The more difficult issue is how to evaluate collateral damage to a neutral 
State’s EEZ, as well as to those portions of its continental shelf that extend 
beyond the outer limits of its EEZ.30 The traditional laws of armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
ish total exclusion zone during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War was one example. This 
objection was based on interference with the freedom of navigation and overflight under 
the High Seas Convention of 1958. Vojtech Mastny, The Soviet Union and the Falklands War, 
36 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 46, 49 (1983); Sandesh Sivakumaran, Exclusion Zones in 
the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea: Evolution in Law and Practice, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 152, 180–81 (2016). 
29. If an enemy merchant ship is considered a military objective, it becomes a lawful 
target of attack and the collateral damage rule is not relevant. Prior to World War II, inter-
national law prohibited attacks on merchant vessels unless there was provision for the 
safety of passengers and crew as codified in the 1936 London Protocol, which recognized 
merchant ships’ immunity from attack if that condition was not met. These rules were 
largely ignored during World War II and again during the Iran-Iraq War. See U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLLEGE, U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP1-
14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.1, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶¶  8.2.2, 8.3 (1997) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HAND-
BOOK]; UK MANUAL, supra note 18, at 359–61; Francis V. Russo, Jr., Neutrality at Sea in 
Transition: State Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging International Customary Law, 19 OCEAN 
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 (1988). 
30. In this context, the only relevant neutral continental shelf is that portion of the 
shelf that extends beyond the outer limit of the EEZ. That portion of a continental shelf 
within the EEZ falls within the EEZ regime. 
The deep seabed and subsoil thereof beyond a coastal State’s EEZ and continental 
shelf, namely the “Area” as referred to in Article 136 of the LOSC, is the “common herit-













and neutrality at sea were formulated during the era when the ocean was 
divided into two parts, territorial seas and the high seas; naturally, therefore, 
lacking rules on naval warfare in the EEZ of a neutral State. Any attempt to 
codify modern laws of armed conflict and neutrality at sea has only succeed-
ed in the drafting of non-binding documents, such as the San Remo Manual. 
If this new maritime area extending beyond a coastal State’s territorial 
sea has the same legal character as that of the high seas purely from the per-
spectives of the laws of armed conflict and neutrality at sea, the issue would 
be quite simple: collateral damage to a coastal neutral State and neutral ship-
ping in the EEZ would be treated similarly to that occurring on the high 
seas. However, in cases where a neutral coastal State’s rights in the EEZ 
have some bearing on the laws of armed conflict and neutrality at sea, the 
permissible scope of belligerent naval operations in neutral EEZs may be 
reduced. Therefore, damage caused by certain belligerent activities that are 
not permissible in a neutral EEZ would not be regarded as collateral dam-
age as defined by the law of armed conflict and neutrality at sea, and a neu-
tral coastal State would no longer be obliged to acquiesce in such damage 
regardless of whether it met the law of armed conflict standard of excessive. 
For instance, during anti-submarine operations in the neutral EEZ, a de-
stroyer of a belligerent State might launch attacks against an enemy subma-
rine that cause physical damage to the EEZ’s living and mineral resources, 
such as eel spawning areas and smoking chimneys containing rare earth 
metals on its ocean floor. 
In addressing the question of the lawfulness of belligerent activities in a 
neutral EEZ, again, the analysis of the interrelationship between the law of 
the sea and the laws of armed conflict and neutrality at sea is of significant 
importance. It seems sufficient here, however, to briefly refer to the follow-
ing points. 
If it is accepted that the LOSC articles on the EEZ apply to belligerent 
operations in times of armed conflict, the answer would depend on whether 
those operations can be said to be included in the freedoms referred to in 
Article 87 (freedom of the high seas) made applicable to the EEZ by Article 
58(1), which addresses the “rights and duties of other States in the exclusive 
economic zone.”31 This same question arises when the lawfulness of foreign 
                                                                                                                      
thought that conducting hostilities against an enemy in, on and over the high seas is not 
unlawful. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 18, ¶ 10. The question here is whether 
the issue of incidental damage caused to the Area and its resources should be treated dif-
ferently from that occurring on the high seas. 












peacetime military exercises or maneuvers in the EEZ are examined. If the 
answer to this question is affirmative and the coastal State does not have any 
military or security-related jurisdiction, military activities would be consid-
ered as one of the “freedoms” referred to in Article 8732 and, as provided 
for in Article 56(2), “the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provi-
sions of this Convention.”33 In this case, the collateral damage issue may be 
resolved in the same way as that of damage occurring on the high seas. 
However, because Article 58(3) imposes a corresponding duty on non-
coastal user States, it cannot be decisively held that a neutral coastal State 
and a belligerent State are on equal legal footing in the former’s EEZ in 
times of armed conflict at sea. Indeed, as Article 58(3) states: 
 
[other] States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal 
State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the 
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and 
other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with 
this Part.34 
 
Although requiring compatibility with other rules of international law, the 
wording might be interpreted as giving greater weight to the rights of the 
coastal State. If so, the permissible scope of belligerent operations in times 
of armed conflict might be somewhat reduced. This could mean that a neu-
tral coastal State does not need to acquiesce to damage caused to its EEZ by 
belligerent actions not authorized by Article 58(3), even if not excessive. 
If, however, the right to conduct belligerent operations in a neutral EEZ 
is not one of the Article 58 freedoms, we must go beyond the analysis based 
on Articles 56 and 58 and examine the applicability of Article 59 (“basis for 
the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction 
in the exclusive economic zone”), which has also been invoked in relation to 
foreign peacetime military exercises in the EEZ. Article 59 establishes a 
conflict resolution mechanism regarding so-called “residual rights” and ju-
risdiction that the LOSC explicitly attributes neither to coastal States nor to 
                                                                                                                      
32. For an analysis of this issue, see Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Coastal State Jurisdiction over 
Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone, in MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: 
A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME 
COMMONS 23, 24–27 (Peter Dutton ed., 2010) (U.S. Naval War College China Maritime 
Study No. 7). 
33. LOSC, supra note 16, art. 56(2). 













other States.35 Without indicating any substantive elements to be considered, 
it merely provides that a conflict regarding residual rights and jurisdiction 
“should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests 
involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a 
whole.”36 The analysis would turn on whether or not it can be said that to 
conduct belligerent activities during armed conflict is regarded as an “attrib-
ute[d] right” of “other States” in accordance with Article 59 criteria.37 
Another possibility is to treat the LOSC as just a peacetime treaty and in 
times of armed conflict the traditional laws of armed conflict and neutrality 
at sea prevail.38 Although this appears to be one variation of the EEZ-high 
seas assimilation theory, it differs from the above-addressed theory based on 
Article 58, which presupposes the continuing validity of the LOSC in war-
time and dictates that the legality of belligerent activities should be assessed 
in accordance with Article 58. On the other hand, under the assimilation 
theory based on the classic peacetime/wartime dichotomy, the EEZ articles 
of the LOSC have virtually no importance under the laws of armed conflict 
and neutrality, and collateral damage caused by belligerent activities in the 






                                                                                                                      
35. See Pedrozo, supra note 32, at 23–26. 
36. LOSC, supra note 16, art. 59. 
37. The specific Article 59 criteria are uncertain. Treves found that Article 59 only 
implied an obligation to the parties to negotiate in good faith. Tullio Treves, Military Instal-
lations, Structures and Devices on the Seabed, 74 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
808, 844 (1980). Pedrozo examined Article 59 from the perspective of the coastal State, 
finding that security interests were not a residual right. Pedrozo, supra note 32, at 24. 
38. Richard R. Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force under the Charter, 
62 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 68, 73 (1968); Patrick M. 
Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality, the Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARVARD 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 249, 305 (1976). The Swedish delegation declared on 
several occasions during the LOSC negotiations that the Convention does not affect the 
law of neutrality. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 136th plen. 
mtg., ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.136 (Aug. 26, 1980); 163rd plen. mtg., ¶ 9, 













IV. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION 
 
A. Nuclear Contamination Not Causing Physical Damage 
 
Two situations causing nuclear contamination are conceivable: one resulting 
from the use of nuclear weapons, the other from the destruction of military 
targets containing nuclear material. The law of armed conflict has focused 
mainly on the former. One of the remaining questions is whether the ordi-
nary collateral damage rule also applies in the latter situation and therefore 
to its lawfulness. Before discussing this question, however, this section 
briefly analyzes contamination caused by the use of nuclear weapons. 
The issue of the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons is beyond the 
scope of this article; hence, the analysis below considers collateral damage 
issues arising from their use and simply presupposes that there are some 
situations where the use of nuclear weapons is not unlawful.39 However, if 
nuclear weapons as a means of warfare are unlawful weapons as such, the 
use of nuclear weapons even against enemy combatants and military objec-
tives is unlawful, and to examine collateral damage to civilians and civilian 
objects is therefore unnecessary. 
If nuclear contamination as a result of the use of nuclear weapons leads 
to the incidental death, injury or disease of civilians,40 these are undoubtedly 
treated as collateral damage as envisaged by the law of armed conflict. Acute 
radiation syndrome caused to civilian fishermen or merchant ship crew by 
nuclear fallout emanating from the explosion of nuclear torpedoes directed 
against belligerent surface combatants on the high seas is an example of the 
potential collateral damage.41 
                                                                                                                      
39. For declarations and reservations concerning the use of nuclear weapons made by 
some States when signing or ratifying API, see supra note 14. 
40. Civilian casualties by nuclear attacks against two Japanese cities in 1945 cannot be 
treated as collateral damage because it is clear that civilians were intentionally targeted. See 
Gabriella Blum, The Law of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1, 22 (2010) (“In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of inno-
cent civilians were targeted.”). 
41. Several Japanese fishing boats, including the Lucky Dragon No.5 (the Daigo Fuku-
ryu-Maru), were heavily contaminated by the hydrogen bomb testing on the Bikini Atoll in 
1954 and some crewmembers were killed and seriously injured by acute radiation syn-
drome. Japanese Fishermen Encountered an Atomic-Bomb Test in the Bikini, YOMIURI SHIMBUN 
(Mar. 16, 1954); RALPH EUGENE LAPP, THE VOYAGE OF THE LUCKY DRAGON (1958). If 
a nuclear weapon was used against enemy warships at sea in wartime, physical damage to 














Nuclear contamination may cause non-physical damage in addition to 
physical damage. Article 52(2) of API defining military objectives uses the 
term “neutralization” in addition to “destruction” and “capture.”42 It pro-
vides that “military objectives are limited to those objects . . . whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization . . . offers a definite military ad-
vantage.”43 The term neutralization could mean the non-physical disabling 
of a military objective.44 Cutting the electric power supply to an early warn-
ing radar system or dispersing landmines around a nuclear weapons factory 
may be deemed as neutralization. On the contrary, interestingly, API Arti-
cles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) define collateral damage as “incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, [and] damage to civilian objects.”45 Although 
this definition uses the terms “loss,” “injury” and “damage,” it avoids using 
the term “neutralization.”46 
Interpreting the relevant collateral damage rules of API literally, these 
provisions exclude neutralization or non-physical disabling of civilian ob-
jects from the scope of collateral damage, requiring that the damage be 
physical.47 A potential example of non-physical damage to civilians and civil-
ian objects may occur when cyber means are used against military objectives 
such as belligerent electricity transmission systems that result in the loss of 
power in civilian population areas.48 
                                                                                                                      
42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52(2). 
43. Id. (emphasis added). 
44. Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks 4, 
ICRC (Nov. 19, 2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/applicabilityofihlto 
cna.pdf. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s API Commentary does not refer 
to this issue. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 635–36 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bru-
no Zimmermann eds., 1987). Threshold or intensity issues have also been discussed in the 
jus ad bellum context. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Coun-
termeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 697 (2014). 
45. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii). 
46. Id. 
47. As described earlier, Article 49(3) of API geographically limits the applicability of 
these collateral damage treaty rules; therefore, they are not applicable as treaty rules to 
collateral damage caused to merchant vessels at sea. Furthermore, some State parties have 
been denying the applicability of the API treaty rules to the use of nuclear weapons. See 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 14, at 504, 506, 510, 512. However, it is 
probably safe to say that the concept and scope of collateral damage embodied in API’s 
provisions constitute customary law. CIHL, supra note 14, at 46–50. 
48. An electric power blackout itself has not been considered as collateral damage un-












If this interpretation requiring physical damage is correct, mere low-level 
nuclear contamination that has neither a neutralizing nor disabling effect on 
civilian objects is not damage in the sense of the law of armed conflict. In 
the same vein, low-level nuclear contamination of civilians who have not 
developed any related illness may not be treated as collateral damage. 49 
Therefore, such below-the-threshold “damage” that has no neutralizing or 
disabling effect would not be considered collateral damage, and a victim bel-
ligerent State cannot claim compensation from its enemy State.50 
The remaining problem is, therefore, how to set the threshold, that is, 
what is the lowest level of nuclear contamination that would physically in-
jure the civilian population or natural living resources? Two incidents in the 
                                                                                                                      
plants were destroyed by aerial bombing, but resulting power shortages have not generally 
been treated as collateral damage for which lawfulness is assessed according to the propor-
tionality principle. Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva 
Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990–91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
ENGLISH LAW 63, 79 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993); Henry Shue & David Wippman, Limiting 
Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions, 35 CORNELL INTER-
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 559, 565–69 (2002); TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 159–64 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
49. In 2011, a huge earthquake and the subsequent tsunami destroyed the northeast 
coastal area of Japan. The tsunami crippled a nuclear power plant in Fukushima and its 
operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), could not prevent a nuclear melt-
down. In 2012, several crewmembers of the USS Ronald Reagan who had participated in a 
massive U.S. disaster relief campaign in the area (Operation Tomodachi (Friendship)) filed 
suit in a U.S. federal district court against TEPCO. They claimed a host of medical condi-
tions related to radiation exposure and asserted that TEPCO knowingly gave false infor-
mation concerning the condition of the Fukushima plant and “coaxed” the ship closer to 
it. The key issue is whether any illness these crewmembers developed is a result of radia-
tion exposure during the operation. The case went forward pending appeals in the U.S. 
9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Mathew M. Burke, 16 Ships that Aided in Operation Tomodachi 
Still Contaminated with Radiation, STARS AND STRIPES (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www.stripes. 
com/news/16-us-ships-that-aided-in-operation-tomodachi-still-contaminated-with-
radiation-1.399094; Operation Tomodachi: Shadow of Nuclear Radiation, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Ja-
pan), Oct. 1, 2015 (evening ver.), at 9. 
50. A similar argument was made in relation to space activities. To avoid any legal re-
sponsibility, the Soviet Union appeared to take the position that nuclear contamination 
caused by the reentry of its nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos 954 in 1978 did not fall 
within the scope of damage defined by Article 1(a) of the 1972 Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects because scattered radioactive debris 
did not cause any physical damage to Canadian populations or objects. Joseph A. Burke, 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects: Definition and Determina-
tion of Damages after the Cosmos 954 Incident, 8 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 













last thirty years illustrate the effect of nuclear contamination. The first is the 
disastrous Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 that resulted in 
the closure of vast areas around the plant site. The second is the Fukushima 
nuclear plant meltdown following the earthquake and tsunami. Since 2011, 
the Japanese government has prohibited people from living in the adjacent 
nuclear contaminated areas.51 
Although no one has defined with confidence the level of negligible ra-
dioactive exposure, when nuclear contamination occurs in belligerent terri-
tory during armed conflict it is necessary to examine the threshold issue to 
decide the applicability of the collateral damage rule. It is all the more diffi-
cult to set the threshold if very long-term radiation effects to civilian popu-
lations, in addition to the more immediate acute radiation syndrome, are 
taken into account. 
As far as belligerent land, sea and aerial territories are concerned, caus-
ing below-the-threshold nuclear contamination would not be unlawful if we 
simply follow the literal interpretation of the collateral damage rules of the 
law of armed conflict. However, it is appropriate to remember again that 
this is valid only for the damage occurring in a belligerent State. The law of 
neutrality does not require a neutral State to acquiesce in even below-the-
threshold damage to their territory and population. Moreover, as previously 
discussed, the lawfulness of below-the-threshold incidental damage to the 
neutral EEZ depends on its status during armed conflict. 
 
B. Nuclear Contamination of the Natural Environment 
 
Although it is rather difficult to define the natural environment for the pur-
pose of the law of armed conflict, certain objects within the natural envi-
ronment can be military objectives. For instance, Article 2(4) of the Incendi-
ary Weapons Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weap-
ons prohibits actions to make “forests or other kinds of plant cover the ob-
ject of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are 
used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objec-
tives, or are themselves military objectives.”52 
                                                                                                                      
51. Nuclear Reactor Incidents: Chernobyl and Fukushima, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), Mar. 16, 
2016 (evening ver.), at 9. 
52. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171. This provision provides that the natural environment is not 
immune from attack if it covers military objectives or is itself a military objective. Judging 












API Article 52(1) defines civilian objects negatively as “all objects which 
are not military objectives.”53 This means that there is no intermediate or 
third category. Accordingly, it is arguable that the entire natural environ-
ment of a belligerent State—other than that which constitutes military ob-
jectives—is a civilian object. 
It is easy to envisage that certain areas of forests, ponds, beaches and 
other terrain may be treated as civilian objects following API’s negative def-
inition methodology. However, curiously, the natural environment not con-
stituting a military objective is not necessarily treated as a civilian object. For 
instance, although Article 52(1) provides that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be 
the object of attack,” Articles 35(3) and 55 merely prohibit actions causing 
“widespread, long-term and severe damage” to the natural environment.54 
By not making clear the unlawfulness of environmental damage not meeting 
these criteria, API appears to deny general protection to the natural envi-
ronment.55 In addition, Article 55(1) is somewhat anthropocentric because it 
provides that “[t]his protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods 
or means of warfare which are intended or expected to cause such damage 
                                                                                                                      
objectives is not in itself a military objective, such environment is subject to attack because 
of its function. However, by definition, such natural environment should be categorized as 
a military objective. 
53. Article 52(2) defines military objectives as “limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 
54. Article 35 is applicable even to hostilities at sea that have no direct effects on the 
civilian population on land. This is because, unlike Article 55, Article 35 is provided for in 
Part III (Methods and Means of Warfare, Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status) of the 
Protocol, which is outside the scope of the geographical limitation found in Article 49(3). 
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may affect the 
civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They further apply to all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air. 
55. Article 1(1) of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hos-
tile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) prohibits a 
State Party from using “environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State 
Party.” Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. By 
prohibiting hostile use of certain modification techniques, the ENMOD Convention indi-
rectly protects the natural environment; however, it does not provide general protection to 
the natural environment due to Article 1(1)’s threshold of widespread, long-lasting or se-













to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of 
the population.”56 
Although as a treaty relating to individual criminal responsibility the 
1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court57 does not directly regulate 
the conduct of States, Article 8(2)(b)(iv), concerning war crimes arising from 
the launching of attacks which cause excessive collateral damage, has no an-
thropocentric element.58 Instead, it introduces the proportionality principle 
to the assessment of environmental collateral damage. The provision, how-
ever, still maintains the “widespread, long-term and severe” damage criteria.  
Because the portion of the belligerent’s natural environment that is not a 
military objective may not enjoy general protection as a civilian object, its 
nuclear contamination may not be treated as a violation of the law of armed 
conflict, unless it results in widespread, long-term or severe environmental 
damage.59 This lack of general protection is one of the striking defects of the 
current law of armed conflict. 
 
V. NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION FROM DESTROYED NUCLEAR-
POWERED WARSHIPS 
 
A. Release of Dangerous Forces Contained in Destroyed Targets 
 
There are several instances in which nuclear contamination caused by bellig-
erent actions could be considered as collateral damage, the lawfulness of 
which could be judged according to the proportionality principle. However, 
as discussed above, the collateral damage rule usually presupposes physical 
effects caused by an attacker’s bombs or missiles upon civilians or civilian 
                                                                                                                      
56. See Julian Wyatt, Law-Making at the Intersection of Environmental, Humanitarian and 
Criminal Law: The Issue of Damage to the Environment in International Armed Conflict, 92 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 593, 607 (2010) (emphasis added). 
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90. 
58. For a detailed analysis of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) from the “ecocentric” point of view, 
see Jessica C. Lawrence & Kevin Jon Heller, The First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime: 
The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 20 GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 61 (2007). 
59. Here again, this is valid only for the damage to a belligerent State’s natural envi-













objects surrounding targeted military objectives.60 On the other hand, nucle-
ar contamination from damaged nuclear-powered warships does not result 
directly from the attacker’s means, but from nuclear material released from 
targeted military objectives. 
Conversely, Article 56(1) of API provides that “[w]orks or installations 
containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical gen-
erating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these 
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dan-
gerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian popula-
tion.”61 Additional Protocol II contains identical language in Article 15.62 
Although API Article 56(2) provides that the special protection against 
attack for those works and installations identified in paragraph 1 is lost in 
specific situations,63 this Article is unique because it gives protection to spe-
cific types of military objectives. The reason is obvious: these works and 
installations contain dangerous forces and their release would significantly 
                                                                                                                      
60. This article does not examine legal issues of incidental injury to civilians located in 
military objectives, for example, civilians being evacuated in belligerent military vehicles 
not displaying the civil defense protective emblem or present in a militarily important rail-
way station. If injuries to civilians inside military objectives are treated as collateral damage 
as envisaged by the law of armed conflict, the lawfulness of attacks against such targets 
containing civilians would be assessed in accordance with the proportionality principle. 
This is virtually equal to legalization of human shield tactics. If the death of, or injuries to, 
civilians in military objectives are not considered as collateral damage, it could be said that 
the attack against them is lawful irrespective of the number of casualties because they are 
there at their own risk. To deal with this issue, it may be appropriate to divide military 
objectives into two categories: those open to civilians, such as bridges and roads, and 
those closed to unauthorized civilians, such as military vehicles and bases. Incidental dam-
age to civilians in the former open military objectives could be treated as collateral damage 
assessed in accordance with the principle of proportionality. 
61. For a critical analysis of Article 56, see W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 
32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 202–18 (1990). 
62. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art 15, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
63. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 56(2)(a)–(b), which provides the fol-
lowing specific situations: 
for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, sig-
nificant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way 
to terminate such support [and] for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it pro-
vides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if 













harm the surrounding civilian population in the ordinary course of events.64 
For the three designated military objectives, it is very clear that a belligerent 
attacking them is legally responsible for the severe damage that would result. 
  However, as a treaty provision, this special protection is given only to 
the three specified works and installations, and this protection cannot be 
interpreted to be given to other similar facilities, such as nuclear fuel facto-
ries. Further, Article 49(3) limits the geographical scope of the application of 
API’s provisions, including Article 56, to land warfare, as discussed earlier.65 
 
B. Destruction of Nuclear-Powered Warships 
 
From the humanitarian and environmental points of view, it might be desir-
able to extend Article 56-type protection to all similar works and installa-
tions on land and at sea.66 If this extension of special protection were to oc-
cur, launching an attack against military objectives such as large fuel and 
munition depots located in civilian populated areas would be prohibited. 
However, then the surrounding civilian populations would practically func-
tion as human shields and a considerable degree of imbalance emerges—the 
depots could continue to be used to support military operations, while the 
opposing belligerent is virtually prohibited from attacking them. 
Unless the locating of such military objectives in and around civilian 
populations can be effectively prohibited, it is inconceivable and undesirable 
to expand Article 56-type protection to all similar fixed works and installa-
tions. Even API does not attempt such a prohibition, merely providing in 
Article 58 that “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent feasible  
. . . endeavour to remove the civilian population . . . from the vicinity of mil-
                                                                                                                      
64. In the wake of the 2011 Fukushima incident, it was revealed that in the 1980s the 
Japanese government asked the Japan Institute of International Affairs to prepare a report 
on the anticipated nuclear contamination that would result from attacks on Japanese nu-
clear facilities in wartime. Attacks against Nuclear Reactors: Top-Secret Scenario, ASAHI 
SHIMBUN (Tokyo), July 31, 2011, at 1. The classified report was submitted to the govern-
ment in 1984. NIHON KOKUSAI-MONDAI KENKYU-JYO (JAPAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS), GENSHIRO-SHISETSU NI TAISURU KOGEKI NO EIKYOU NI KANSURU 
ICHI-KOSATSU (A REFLECTION UPON THE EFFECT OF ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FA-
CILITIES) (1984) (on file with author). 
65. See supra Part II.A. 
66. In the API drafting process, some States proposed a provision totally banning at-
tacks against any works and installations containing dangerous forces. BOTHE, PARTSCH & 
SOLF, supra note 12, at 350–53; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, supra note 44, at 666–68; Parks, su-












itary objectives,” [and] “avoid locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas.”67 Furthermore, unlike the Hague Cultural Property 
Convention and its protocols, API does not introduce a separation regime 
to give special protection to certain kinds of civilian objects.68 
In the same vein, if an ordinary collateral damage rule based on the pro-
portionality principle is applied, an attack destroying a nuclear-powered 
submarine might be prohibited in certain situations due to excessive collat-
eral nuclear contamination. However, such submarines are an important 
part of several navies69 and their use as a means of warfare is not unlawful. 
It is, therefore, impossible to prohibit the launch of attacks against such a 
highly effective weapon platform by extending Article 56-type protection 
without prohibiting their use in naval warfare. To solve this dilemma, there 
might be no other way than to argue that the military advantage gained from 
the destruction of enemy nuclear-powered warships should always be con-
sidered to be greater than collateral nuclear contamination, however devas-
tating it may be. However, such argument would make the customary law 
principle of proportionality almost meaningless. 
Further, to extend the concept of collateral damage to include damage 
by dangerous forces released from destroyed targets is problematic. Howev-
er, if such extension is not allowed, another serious problem arises: neither a 
user-belligerent State nor an attacking belligerent State appears to be re-





As far as damage incidentally caused to personnel and objects in neutral ter-
ritory and to a neutral State’s natural environment, the laws of armed con-
flict and neutrality do not obligate an injured neutral State to acquiesce to 
such damage, even if it does not rise to the level of excessiveness. The same 
can be said of certain damage to natural resources in the neutral EEZ.  
                                                                                                                      
67. Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 58(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
68. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (noting that Article 8(1)(a) provides that in order 
for a cultural property refuge to be granted special protection it must be “situated at an 
adequate distance . . . from any important military objective”). 
69. As of the time of this writing, China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States operate nuclear-powered submarines. Three navies, France, Russia 













On the other hand, damage to belligerent and neutral State civilians and 
civilian objects in a belligerent’s territory and EEZ and on the high seas, 
that is damage to those located in areas where hostilities and other belliger-
ent acts can be lawfully undertaken, is considered collateral damage that is 
assessed by the proportionality principle. Damage to belligerent State civil-
ians and civilian objects in a neutral EEZ is (perhaps) treated similarly. 
Just as with other damage, including physical damage, a neutral State is 
not required to acquiesce to below-the-threshold damage in its territory or 
to its natural environment. However, when below-the-threshold damage 
occurs in the belligerent’s territory and EEZ and on the high seas, it may be 
argued that such “damage” does not even fall within the concept of damage 
from the perspectives of the laws of armed conflict and neutrality. Contrary 
to similar below-the-threshold damage to a neutral State, an injured belliger-
ent State would not be entitled to ask for compensation. 
In this way, unlike the law of armed conflict applicable on land, the de-
termination of lawful and unlawful collateral damage mainly depends on the 
classification of the area where it occurs. If the methods and means of war-
fare employed cause unlawful collateral damage, an attacking belligerent 
State incurs international responsibility. It is relatively easy to identify the 
responsible belligerent State, and, in certain cases, members of its armed 
forces are criminally responsible for war crimes when causing unlawful ex-
cessive collateral damage. 
In contrast, however, in the case of nuclear contamination resulting 
from the destruction of a nuclear-powered warship, it is legally difficult to 
decide who is responsible. As the earlier analysis has indicated, this is simply 
because neither their use nor the attack upon such vessels outside neutral 
territorial seas are unlawful from the law of armed conflict’s perspective, 
unlike attacks on certain protected works and installations on the ground, 
even where they are military objectives. When nuclear contamination from a 
destroyed nuclear-powered warship causes unlawful collateral damage, 
whether to civilians, civilian objects or the natural environment of either a 
belligerent or a neutral State, the injured State will face this difficult situa-
tion: no belligerent State is responsible for nuclear contamination from the 
perspective of the laws of armed conflict and neutrality.70 This means that 
the laws of armed conflict and neutrality leave an injured State without a 
                                                                                                                      
70. An injured State can still invoke the responsibility of a belligerent State if its use of 












remedy for the contamination that will surely result from the destruction of 
a nuclear-powered warship. 
